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EBERHARD KARLS
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Joint Call for Papers

for the panels of the

Conference of the Section „Comparative Politics“ of the German Political Science Association (Deutsche Vereinigung für Politische Wissenschaft – DVPW)

"Unlike Twins?! Comparing Democracies and Autocracies. Insights, Developments and Challenges in Comparative Politics."

15.-17. März 2017 at the Institute of Political Science, Eberhard Karls University Tübingen

In cooperation with: Working Group (AK) "Vergleichende Diktatur- und Extremismusforschung", Working Group (AK) "Demokratieforschung", Landeszentrale für Politische Bildung Baden-Württemberg.

Local Organizers: Rolf Frankenberger, Thomas Altmepfen, Mirjam Edel and Oliver Schlumberger

Conference languages: German and English

Submission Deadline for paper proposals is November 20, 2016.

Goals: Identifying and comparing political systems in various perspectives is the core of the of Comparative Politics as a discipline. In the previous decades, a clear focus of the highly differentiated comparisons in the disciplines subfields lay on democracies rather than on autocracies and systematic comparisons have frequently been eschewed. It is only in recent years that comparative research on autocracies skyrocketed. A fast growing body of literature investigates in autocratic institutions, power, legitimation, policies and so on. As a result, comparative politics now can draw much more differentiated pictures of how authoritarian regimes function, succeed, and fail in terms of regime persistence.

Empirical developments such as the (more or less surprising) resilience and economic prosperity of autocracies, transitions from democracy and authoritarian shifts inside and outside the EU, increasing inequalities within and between societies and the uprising and spreading of extremism and terrorism in Europe and elsewhere make systematic comparisons of democracy and autocracy even more important. Keeping in mind the developments in the discipline it seems to be helpful to step back and to discuss the foundations, approaches, methods and basic concepts, including the dimensions of polity, policy and politics that we have started to discuss at the previous conference of the section „Comparative Politics“ in Hamburg (February 2015).

The conference aims to be a platform for bringing together scholars in order to discuss recent developments and challenges related to the systematic comparison of democracy and autocracy. This includes a critical reappraisal of existing concepts, methods, and findings, as well as the discussion of new perspectives in comparative politics. The two main objectives thus are to capture the state of the art of the discipline and to assess the (old and new) challenges we face when we compare different political regimes, such as autocracy and democracy.

The conference will comprise 14 panels addressing various aspects of the discipline. We encourage scholars of comparative politics and neighboring disciplines to contribute to the discussion and propose papers focusing on key aspects of the panels.

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Technical Information

Structure: Panels (90 minutes) include up to four individual papers. (If the number of papers makes it necessary, there might be the opportunity for double-panels). Conference languages are German and English. Conference participants therefore should be ready to receive German and English presentations at the conference. Paper givers should please stick to the panels working languages that are indicated in the CfPs.

Deadline for submitting **paper proposals** is **November 20, 2016**.

Paper Proposals shall not exceed a length of 800 words.

Please send your paper proposal directly to the panel convenors (see addresses in the calls) and please cc: the conference organizers: rolf.frankenberger@uni-tuebingen.de

Panel Chairs will decide on the acceptance of papers until **November 30, 2016**. The conference program will be published until **December 10, 2016**.

Further information will be subsequently published at:

<http://vergleichdvpw2017.wordpress.com>

1. Parliamentary representation in non-democratic regimes

Chairs:

Katharina Buck, University of Bremen; k.buck@uni-bremen.de

Esther Somfalvy, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH); somfalvy@bigsss-bremen.de

Description

Multi-party parliaments have become the norm even in non-democratic countries. Although current research acknowledges that parliaments perform a number of functions in non-democratic regimes and may contribute to regime stability (or democratic transformation), there is a considerable research gap concerning the inner workings of parliaments.

The panel welcomes papers (both comparative work and case studies) that explore all aspects of parliamentary representation in non-democratic regimes.

Our papers share a regional focus on the patronal regimes of post-Soviet Eurasia. They offer an overall comparison of parliaments and legislatures in the post-Soviet space; analyze how different types of authoritarian regimes affect parliamentary representation and ask whether MPs in non-democratic regimes actually 'represent' their citizens; and scrutinize the roles of presidential 'pocket parliaments' such as the 'Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan' that have enjoyed increasing manifestation of institutional identity and public presence.

We therefore particularly invite contributions from scholars working on authoritarian parliamentary regimes in regions outside the post-Soviet space, for example in other post-colonial and/or post-communist contexts, to stimulate what we expect will be a very fruitful debate on non-democratic legislatures.

For further information regarding the panel please contact Esther Somfalvy (somfalvy@ifsh.de)

2. „Macht Religion politische Systeme autokratisch? “

Chairs:

Prof. Dr. Gert Pickel, Universität Leipzig, pickel@rz.uni-leipzig.de

PD Dr. Oliver Hidalgo, Universität Regensburg

Description (Panel will be held in German)

Die Kernfrage des vorgeschlagenen Panels ist zu untersuchen, *Welche Auswirkungen besitzt Religion auf Prozesse der Demokratisierung und welche Rolle spielt Religion zum Erhalt oder für den Umbruch demokratischer zu autokratischen bzw. autokratischen zu demokratischen politischen Systemen?* Diese Fragestellung soll unter Einbezug theoretischer Überlegungen als auch empirischer Forschungsarbeiten auf unterschiedlichen Analyseebenen untersucht werden. Dies impliziert auch Überlegungen, welche Rolle Religion in unterschiedlichen Herrschaftssystemen spielt. Es wird dabei von einem offenen und breiten Verständnis von Religion, Säkularität und Demokratie ausgegangen. Wichtig ist die Identifikation der Rahmenbedingungen unter denen Religion die Rolle des Konfliktgenerators, Brandbeschleunigers für Konflikte oder Konfliktregulators einnimmt.

Ausgangssituation und Fragestellung:

In den letzten Jahrzehnten wurde wenn Religion in den Medien im Zusammenhang mit Demokratie genannt wurde, zumeist eine eher ungünstige Verbindung hergestellt. Sei es ein „Kampf der Kulturen“ (Huntington) oder der Verweis auf Theokratien bzw. dem negativen Einfluss einer fehlenden Trennung von Kirche und Staat, Religion schien die Rolle des „bösen Buben“ oder zumindest „Spielverderbers“, was die Etablierung von Demokratie angeht, einzunehmen. Dies kam für viele westliche Politikwissenschaftler nicht überraschend, wird doch seit der Aufklärung eher das Model vertreten, dass ein mehr an „Säkularität“ auch ein mehr an Demokratie gewährleisten dürfte. Es sind dann eher wenige kritische Stimmen, zumeist aus der Area-Forschung oder der religionsbezogenen Forschung, die eine sich so gelegentlich abzeichnende lineare Negativ-Beziehung Religion-Demokratie in Frage stellen. Zum einen kann man an das Argument von Emile Durkheim anschließen, dass Religion eigentlich einen integrativen Charakter besitzt. Zum anderen kann es ja sein, dass ganz unterschiedliche Wege im Umfeld von „*Multiple Modernities*“ zum Ergebnis Demokratie führen. Zuletzt besteht die Möglichkeit, dass Modernisierung und Demokratisierung unter bestimmten Umständen in keinem Zusammenhang stehen. In dieser Diskussion wird auch deutlich, dass sowohl das Verständnis von Demokratie als auch das Verständnis von Säkularität bei weitem nicht so eindeutig ist, wie es man lange Zeit annahm.

Dabei ist nicht systematisch bestimmt, unter welchen Rahmenbedingungen (politischer, sozialer oder ökonomischer Natur) Religion welchen Einfluss auf Politik und die Ausgestaltung eines Herrschaftssystems erreicht. Dies differenzierter herauszuarbeiten möchte das vorgeschlagene Panel einen Beitrag leisten. Dabei soll auch die Relevanz, welche Religion in unterschiedlichen Herrschaftssystemen besitzt Beachtung finden. Hierbei wird von einer feineren Zisierung der unterschiedlichen Herrschaftstypen, als die Unterscheidung zwischen Autokratien, hybriden Regimen und Demokratien ausgegangen. Jenseits von Theokratien kommen dabei zum Beispiel Einparteiregime mit starker ethnisch-religiöser Bindung genauso in den Blick, wie Demokratien, in

denen religiöse politische Ansprüche in Form von Parteien oder in der Zivilgesellschaft kanalisiert werden.

Ziel:

Das vorgeschlagene Panel soll sich der Frage der Kompatibilität von Demokratie und Religion in vergleichender Perspektive widmen. Willkommen sind Beiträge, die sich mit dem Wechselverhältnis zwischen Demokratie bzw. Demokratisierung und der Etablierung von Religion in Mikro-, Meso- oder Makroanalysen beschäftigen. Dies schließt theoretische Überlegungen wie auch empirische Zugriffe unterschiedlicher Prägung ein. Am stärksten präferiert wird eine Verbindung theoretischer Ansätze mit empirischer Analyse. Ziel ist zu ermitteln, unter welchen Rahmenbedingungen und in welchem (kulturellen) Umfeld, welche Wechselwirkung zwischen Religion und Demokratie sich konstituiert. Sowohl Religion als auch Demokratie werden dabei in einem weiten Sinne verstanden und sollten in ihrem Verständnis in den dann eingereichten Vorträgen transparent gemacht werden. Die leitende Kernfrage der Beiträge sollte sein: *Welche Auswirkungen besitzt Religion auf Prozesse der Demokratisierung und welche Rolle spielt sie zum Erhalt oder für den Umbruch demokratischer zu autokratischen bzw. autokratischen zu demokratischen politischen Systemen?*

Vorgehen:

Ausgewählt werden soll ein produktiver Mix aus Beiträgen, wobei unterschiedliche methodische Zugänge genauso willkommen sind wie neuere theoretische Einordnungen.

3. “Same, same but different? Comparing the International Promotion of Democracy and Autocracy” (Double Panel)

Chairs:

Julia Leininger, German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, Bonn, julia.leininger@die-gdi.de

Anna Lührmann, V-Dem Institute at the University of Gothenburg, anna.luehrmann@v-dem.net

Description:

After the end of the third wave of democratization, debates about the state and future of democracy have become increasingly gloomy (Diamond & Plattner 2015 ed.). According to some overviews, the world has experienced declining levels of democracy since 2006, while other democracy measures merely identify a general standstill (Levitsky & Way 2015). Despite these disagreements, it is evident that the rapid spread of democratic regimes during the 1990s came to a halt in the 2000s. Many regimes remain in the hybrid zone between liberal democracy and stable autocracy. Several authoritarian regimes have remained stable during recent decades. While democratic governments spend billions of US-dollars to counter these trends by supporting democratization, stable autocratic regimes have used their geostrategic power to prevent further spread of democracy (Carothers 2015; von Soest 2015).

This international dimension of political regimes has gained a lot of attention of scholars and diversified massively. Scholarship on the international promotion of democracy has been increasing steadily since its beginning in the 1990s. It ranges from the analysis of particular working areas such as electoral assistance, civil society support or institutional aid to the question on the effectiveness of democracy promotion (for an overview see Leininger forthcoming). Only more recently, researchers' interest in the international influence on autocratic stability grew (e.g. Bader et al. 2010). This research has been focusing on the diffusion of autocratic norms, international cooperation between autocratic regimes and the influence on their regional neighborhood. However, both strands of literature hardly speak to each other, much less do they learn from each other.

Missing theoretical and conceptual links between the study of democracy and autocracy promotion are relevant in three fields. *First*, little is known about the mechanisms and instruments of autocracy promotion and whether they are similar (or not) to those of democracy promotion (von Soest 2015). *Second*, further research is needed on the explanatory factors of democracy and autocracy promotion. *Third*, although there is empirical evidence that autocracy promotion can effectively contribute to the stability of autocratic regimes, knowledge about the interaction between the effects of democracy and autocracy promotion is very limited. In contrast to an intuitive notion, no evidence was found so far, that autocracy promotion affects the outcome of democracy promotion negatively (Hackenesch 2015).

Against this backdrop, the panel focuses on three overarching issue areas. They provide a common basis for better understanding and explaining the international dimension of political regimes.

1. *Comparing strategies and the implementation of democracy and autocracy promotion as well as the interaction of their effects.* What are objectives of democracy and autocracy promotion, in particular does autocracy promotion foster political change (for instance, autocratic backsliding, challenging democratic regimes, e.g. Russian support of nationalist groups in Germany) or does it

primarily focus on persistence of autocratic regimes? What are commonalities and differences of the instruments of democracy and autocracy promoters? Which factors explain the effectiveness of democracy promotion? Do, and if yes how do, the effects of democracy and autocracy promotion interact?

2. *Identifying civic education and its effects on the change of political attitudes:* What do programs for civic education of democracy promotion (e.g. capacity building for electoral observation) and autocracy promotion (e.g., formation of party members) have in common? Do they effectively support the change of political attitudes that foster either democratic or autocratic political behavior?

3. *Analyzing the potential of functional cooperation for promoting democracy and/or autocracy:* Do inter- and transnational actors promote democracy and/or autocracy through functional cooperation? If yes, under which conditions are these efforts effective? (see Freyburg et al. 2015).

We invite panelists to address at least one of these issue areas. Papers that contribute to the conceptualization of the international dimension of political regimes and that are based on comparative empirical research are most welcome, in particular those that combine the analysis of democracy and autocracy promotion. As regards the second issue area on the change of political attitudes, interdisciplinary approaches (based on socio-psychological and cultural studies) are of interest.

We propose a double-panel; one on the analysis of democracy promotion and another one on autocracy promotion. A selected author of one panel shall serve as discussant for the other panel and vice-versa. For the reasons outlined above, we aim at bridging a pro-active exchange between those who are specialized on the promotion of autocracy and those who are interested in democracy promotion. We believe that this type of interaction is not only needed to better understand the promotion of democracy and autocracy but also to better explain political regimes in general.

We encourage scholars of all stages, including young scholars, PhDs, and senior researchers who are already well known in the study of democracy and autocracy promotion, to contribute to the panel.

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4. State Spending and Taxation in Democracies and Autocracies: Comparing Patterns of Resource Management

Chairs and Discussants:

Dr. Thomas Richter (thomas.richter@giga-hamburg.de), GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies (Hamburg)

Dr. Christian von Soest (christian.vonsoest@giga-hamburg.de), GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies (Hamburg)

Description

How do political institutions impact the management of state resources in democracies and autocracies? Do democracies generally spend more money on social services than autocracies? Do autocracies extract comparatively less taxes from society than democracies? Which significant differences and similarities with regard to the management of state resources exist within each type of regime? Does resource scarcity or abundance shape the establishment of new institutions? The recent comparative literature does not provide sufficient answers to these questions. There are at least four major gaps, which require further investigation:

First, conceptual work does not go beyond the dichotomous distinction between non-electoral and electoral regimes' impact on a state's system of resource management, which furthermore remains contested. Second, most recent empirical work fails to show that this binary regime classification does indeed significantly matter for the choice of taxation and state spending. Third, data on state spending and taxation for countries outside the core of the OECD-world is deficient. Last but not least, how resource availability shapes the creation and reform of political institutions is still unclear.

We therefore invite papers that try to tackle these or additional gaps from different theoretical, methodological, cross-regional and empirical angles. We particularly welcome papers covering at least one of the following aspects:

- Theoretical reflections of how political institutions and/or regime type might shape the evolution of state resource management systems.
- Comparative empirical analyses based on established as well as new measures of institutions and regime types.
- Data generation efforts in order to improve the coverage and quality of existing sources on state spending and taxation.
- Empirical insights into the factors that might shape the kind and degree of state spending and taxation beyond institutional setups.
- Conceptual and empirical inquiries focusing on the (possible) effects of resource availability and state spending with regard to the creation and reform of institutions or the transition of political regimes.

5. Political Competition in Democracies and Autocracies

Chairs

Dr. Johannes Gerschewski, Berlin Social Science Center (WZB), Research Unit “Democracy & Democratization“, johannes.gerschewski@wzb.eu,

Dr. Aiko Wagner, Berlin Social Science Center (WZB), Research Unit “Democracy & Democratization“, aiko.wagner@wzb.eu

Description

For long, the concept of competition has served as the discriminating feature that differentiates between democratic and autocratic regimes. However, recent research efforts have further advanced the concept of political competition *within* the respective “camp” of democracy and autocracy studies. While the democratic camp has differentiated the concept for electoral, party, and institutional competition, the autocracy camp has also re-discovered the concept for their studies on authoritarianism with adjectives. Yet, a dialogue *between* the camps has largely been absent. As of now, the two literature strands parallel each other. In this light, the panel tries to bring together researcher from the democracy and the autocracy background to discuss their experience with the usage of the concept of competition.

- What can be learned from each other?
- How is democratic competition defined in contrast to competition in autocracies?
- What pitfalls and challenges do we share, where are differences in terms of dimensions, levels, actors, explanations?

Papers for this panel might address (1) the conceptual differences of democratic vis-à-vis autocratic political competition, (2) the causes as well as (3) the consequences of different kinds and levels of competition.

In more Detail:

Robert Dahl (1971) famously argued that contestation is one of two essential criteria for polyarchies. In a similar vein, Adam Przeworski’s (1991: 13) defined democracy as “a system of ruled open-endedness, or organized uncertainty”. To be potentially voted out of office and to lose power is the key part of the democratic game. Accordingly, Huntington (1991) has made the turnover idea and the alternation in government the main litmus test for democratizing countries.

In analogy, autocratic systems are characterized by non-contestation. They are systems of (attempted) organized certainty. As such, while political competition is at the heart of democracies, autocracies strive to abandon such open-endedness inherent to political competition.

The concept of political competition has long been used to distinguish democratic from autocratic rule. Yet, on the democratic pole of regime analysis, an abundance of studies have been proposed to further advance the concept of competition in order to arrive at a more fine-grained picture. Most importantly, multidimensional concepts have found its place in the scholarly literature. They highlight among others dimensions like contestability, sensitivity, decidability, conflicting interests, or vulnerabilities to have a more comprehensive understanding of what political competition actually is (see e.g. Strøm 1989, Bartolini 1999, 2000, Immergut and Abou-Chadi 2014, van der Eijk and

Oppenhuis 1991). They thereby imply a multi-level conceptualization of political competition. The degree of competition may vary across democracies depending on micro-level (voters' availability), meso-level (party (spatial) competition), and macro-level (institutions that impact on the level of system competitiveness) features of the respective polity.

On the autocratic pole of regime analysis, we could also observe a growing interest in applying a more nuanced interpretation of competition. Andreas Schedler for example has turned the tables and argued that autocratic leaders are indeed faced with fundamentally uncertain situation. Their hold on power is always challenged (Schedler 2013). "Electoral" and "competitive" authoritarian regimes in which elections are held seem to be the new archetype of modern non-democratic rule (Schedler 2006; Levitsky and Way 2010). Moreover, mixed types, sometimes referred to as hybrid regimes, that combine democratic institutions with autocratic praxis, have emerged globally and have put into question the sharp distinction between democracies with and autocracies without competition. Case-based evidence also suggests that there is much more intra-elite struggle and competition over positions within seemingly homogenous autocratic regimes (Magaloni 2006; Svobik 2012). In autocratic contexts, elections have been characterized as information tools for identifying particularly talented politicians. They serve as a channel to

award and sanction candidates (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009). Pre-electoral competition complements the picture: competition takes place in non-democratic settings, albeit often indirect and hidden.

In this light, we propose to define competition broadly as a "social relationship characterized by a system of interaction among consciously rival autonomous actors" (Bartolini 1999: 438). By so doing, we assume that the term can be made fruitful for empirical research for both sides of the regime pole. However, as of now, the research strands on democracies and autocracies remain largely unconnected. The goal of the panel that we propose here is therefore to bring scholars from both "camps" into closer dialogue. While we are methodical ecumenical and invite contributions from the qualitative and the quantitative research tradition, they should address one of the following questions.

A first set of question is conceptual in nature:

- What concept of political competition do you use?
- Is the concept of political competition applicable both within and across the democracy and autocracy "camp"?
- What are the theoretical and practical challenges in concept building?
- What are the relevant actors and actor constellations in democratic and autocratic regimes? In what way do they differ from each other?

A second set of question deals with explanations:

- What are the causes for (different levels of) political competition?
- In what way do they differ in different regime types?

Thirdly, questions about the consequences of competition might be addressed:

- What are the effects of political competition on policy outputs or regime outcomes like performance and stability?

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6. Challenging the Churchill-Hypothesis Policy-Performance in Democracies and Autocracies in Comparison

Chair:

Jun.-Prof. Dr. Stefan Wurster (University Trier) (for the: Working Group (AK) "Vergleichende Diktatur- und Extremismusforschung"; wurster@uni-trier.de)

Description:

After the "third wave" of democratization ebbed away and "authoritarian great powers" (Gat 2007) like China and Russia returned on the center stage, the race between democratic and autocratic regimes with regard to economic progress, social development and security arouses again. Since at least some autocracies achieve impressive results in important policy fields (looking for example at the economic "success story" of autocracies like China, Singapore, etc.) the "Churchill hypothesis", which describes democracy as the relatively best regime type¹, is getting under serious pressure (Halperin et al. 2008). In fact, looking at urgent policy issues, such as government debt, demographic change or environmental destruction, a systematic democracy deficit seems to exist (Wurster 2012), while autocracies becoming more and more important, when it comes to solve global problems, the democratic states (of the west) aren't able to handle alone any longer.

As the growing literature comparing policy performance of democracies and autocracies (Knutsen 2011; Wu 2012; Schmidt 2013; McGuire 2013; Kailitz 2013b; Wurster 2013; Stockemer 2013) shows, there are indeed remarkable differences between regime types, while democracies are not always the clear winners. It turns out that not only in democracies policy performance is an important source of political leaders to make their rule durable but in autocracies, too (Gerschewski 2013). Yet, as it is true for democracies, all autocracies aren't the same. The differences between autocratic subtypes with regard to policy performance are often greater than between different forms of democracy. Systematization of different democratic and autocratic subtypes is therefore of growing importance (Cheibub et al. 2010; Hadenius and Teorell 2010; Geddes et al. 2012; Kailitz 2013a).

Although in recent years important studies appeared, the research field at the interface of regime type comparison and policy analysis is still young and many questions remain understudied. Therefore it is timely to ask if we can identify systematic patterns in the policy performance of democracies and autocracies in and across various policy fields. Does the "Churchill hypothesis" against the background of current failure of many democracies in solving pressing problems and the (economic) rise of autocratic powers, still exceeds? To what extent do autocratic and democratic states diverge or converge in terms of their policy performance in different policy field? What role does the use of certain policy instruments by democracies and autocracies, such as repression, exchange or association play and what factors besides regime type or subtype helps to explain the performance patterns? How are for example regime type, state capacity and degree of modernization related to each other and what policy effect does this have in different policy fields? And finally, if we can find autocracy advantages in certain policy fields what does this mean for the democracies? How can they

¹ The famous quote of Winston Churchill reads as follows: "No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of Government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time." (Churchill 1974, p. 7566).

learn from their autocratic counterpart and assume certain policies without losing their democratic essence?

The panel welcomes contributions who address these questions from a variety of perspectives, including theoretical critics, conceptual analysis and empirical studies rooted in quantitative, qualitative or mixed methods designs. Comparative analyses may range from intra- and cross-regional small and medium-N comparisons to large-N cross-national studies. Single-case studies are of particular interest if they promise to generate new testable hypotheses or apply original new models. It is the aim of the panel to illuminate the relationship between regime type and policy performance from various perspectives using different methodological approaches to capture the underlying mechanisms, that explains the existing variance and learn more about how policies are performed in and outside the “world of western democracies”.

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7. Bridging Comparative Politics and Area Studies

Chairs:

Jürgen Rüländ, University Freiburg (TBC)

Patrick Köllner, GIGA and University Hamburg, patrick.koellner@giga-hamburg.de

Description / Rationale:

The panel brings together selected contributors to an edited volume (currently under review) which makes the case for Comparative Area Studies (CAS) as a distinct analytical approach connecting deep area knowledge with comparative perspectives. The CAS approach should be of particular interest to comparative-politics scholars studying political phenomena, processes and outcomes within, between and across world regions.

Paper 1: Comparative Area Studies: What It Is, What It Can Do (Patrick Köllner (paper presenter), Ariel Ahram and Rudra Sil)

While deep, sustained research into particular areas or regions of the world remains indispensable, this research risks becoming marginalized in the absence of concerted efforts to link up their findings and connect them to debates that have relevance beyond a single region. Comparative Area Studies (CAS) may be understood as one such effort in that it seeks to balance the contextualized insights generated by traditional area studies with the logic of comparative analysis as applied to intra-, inter-, and cross-regional empirical research. In this paper we first discuss the emergence of CAS as a broad analytic approach that is timely in light of the new challenges and opportunities facing area studies in different regions of the world. We then discuss one particular component of CAS, viz. the comparative analysis of cases drawn from different regions, highlighting the possibilities for engagement with area studies communities in the process of comparing cases drawn from different areas. Finally we consider a range of empirical applications where the CAS approach can be fruitfully leveraged to yield distinctive insights that neither traditional area studies, nor large-N, formal or even mixed-method approaches are designed to deliver.

Paper 2: Comparing Across World Regions: Assets and Pitfalls (Christian von Soest, GIGA, and Alexander Stroh, U Bayreuth)

While area studies traditionally investigate diversity within the regions, research using global datasets tends to underestimate the regional context. Although they offer a sound middle ground for the integration of universal approaches and context knowledge, structured qualitative comparisons across world regions are still rare. This is due to challenges at two levels. First, practical considerations often render qualitative cross-regional comparisons complicated. Our notion of 'applied CAS' implies that one has to reconcile classical small-N designs and practical feasibility for fruitful comparative work. Second, disconnected academic discourses build even higher walls for conceptual advancement and empirical research. Today, not only concepts from Europe or the US create a travelling challenge when being applied to other world regions; social science concepts developed for, for example, Africa do not easily travel to other non-Western regions.

In this paper, we argue that cross-regional comparisons are indispensable if social science really aims at providing middle-range or even general explanations in a globalized world that do not lose touch with reality. We discuss the pitfalls and assets of qualitative cross-area political research and particularly deal with the practical aspects of conducting cross-regional comparisons. The major lesson to be learned is that context and regional diversity demands conceptual clarity and adequate research designs to avoid the most common pitfalls of comparative area studies.

Paper 3: Comparative Area Studies and the Study of Middle East Politics after the Arab Uprisings (André Bank, GIGA)

The Arab uprisings have not only brought about the fall of the heads of state in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen, all-out wars in Syria, Libya and Yemen and the survival of all eight monarchies in the Middle East. In the academic field of Middle East Political Science, the dramatic events of 2011 and after have contributed to the emergence of a more self-critical research program that questions some core theoretical assumptions and methodological approaches of the 1990s and 2000s. At the same time, Middle East Political Science has become more expansive in insisting that accounts for the different political trajectories in the region be grounded in both intra- and extra-regional comparison.

In order to locate these diverse post-2011 studies, this paper uses Comparative Area Studies (CAS) as an analytical perspective which combines the context sensitivity of Area Studies, including Middle East Studies, with the systematic use of comparisons. It finds that while intra-regional comparisons are still the mainstay of political science studies of the Arab uprisings, there is an emerging, promising strand of cross-regional comparisons that draws on insights from e.g. the post-Soviet space or from European history. Inter-regional comparisons remain rare and thus the exception to the rule of the two other types of CAS-related forms of comparison. The paper concludes by evaluating the promises, risks and prospects of following a CAS perspective in the study of Middle East politics and beyond.

In case of interest to contribute to this panel, please contact Patrick Köllner. There is the opportunity to enlarge it as a double panel.

8. Why Wrong Is Right: Justifying Exclusion and Repression in Autocracies and Democracies

Chairs:

Maria Josua, GIGA Institute of Middle East Studies, Hamburg; Maria.Josua@giga-hamburg.de

Julia Grauvogel, GIGA Institute of African Affairs, Hamburg

Description:

Faced with societal discontent or popular protests, political actors in democratic and authoritarian regimes often pursue strategies of exclusion and repression. They restrict civil and political rights, ignore the demands of certain groups, clamp down on protest and arrest activists. Yet, such strategies may backfire as repression and exclusion can encourage protest instead of containing it. Political elites hence attempt to legitimize their course of action vis-à-vis domestic audiences and the international community.

This panel invites conceptual and empirical contributions that investigate how repressive and exclusionary policies are justified in democracies and autocracies. We encourage submissions that address some of the following topics from a cross-regional, intraregional or diachronic perspective:

- (1) the theoretical relation between repression and (its) legitimation as substitutive or complementary strategies of regime survival,
- (2) the narratives that are mobilized to defend repression and exclusion, including threats to national unity or terrorism, and the origins of such narratives,
- (3) the variety of narratives related to different target groups, such as anti-regime activists or the political opposition,
- (4) the international diffusion of narratives and regime repertoires legitimizing repression as well as learning processes across different regimes, their security agencies and other relevant actors.

9. Rente, Revenue und Regime: Zum Nexus von Staatsfinanzierung, Gesellschaft und politischer Herrschafts-ordnung

Chairs:

Philip Fehling; p.fehling@uni-kassel.de

Dr. Stefan Peters (Universität Kassel); stefan.peters@uni-kassel.de

Description

Das Panel untersucht den Nexus von Staatsfinanzierung und politischem Regime. Seit der Boston Tea Party wurde die staatliche Steuerforderung von verschiedenen gesellschaftlichen Kräften immer wieder unter den Vorbehalt effektiver politischer Teilhabe gestellt. Auch die Forschung konstatiert, dass Steuersysteme zentrale Mechanismen von Staatsbildungs- und Demokratisierungsprozessen sind (Bräutigam et al. 2008). Spiegelbildlich argumentieren rententheoretische Ansätze, dass Staaten, deren Finanzierung nicht auf Steuern, sondern auf internationalen Renteneinnahmen basieren, sich oft durch die Stabilität autoritärer Regime und eine hohe Resilienz gegenüber Demokratisierungsforderungen auszeichnen (Herb 2005; Ross 2012). Beiden Forschungssträngen ist gemeinsam, dass sie der Art der Staatsfinanzierung eine Schlüsselrolle bei der Erklärung politischer Regime zuweisen. Zwar zeichnen sich beide Ansätze durch eine überzeugende theoretische Argumentation aus, sie werden jedoch immer wieder empirisch von abweichenden Fällen autokratischer Steuerstaaten (z.B. China) oder demokratischer Rentierstaaten (z.B. Mongolei, Venezuela post-1958) herausgefordert. Als Beitrag zu einer differenzierten und kontextualisierten Analyse des Zusammenhangs von Staatsfinanzierung und politischem Regime möchte das Panel in theoretisch-konzeptionellen Arbeiten sowie empirischen Fall- und Vergleichsstudien den Einfluss verschiedener (sub-)nationaler Steuersysteme und Rentenformen (verschiedene Rohstoffrenten, strategische Renten, fiskalische Renten) sowie die Bedeutung intervenierender Variablen (institutionelle und gesellschaftliche Besonderheiten, Verteilungsfragen, gesellschaftliche Kräfteverhältnisse, *critical junctures*) prüfen und diskutieren.

Die öffentlichen Finanzen sind ein Schlüsselmoment im Verhältnis von Staat und Gesellschaft. In Europa und Nordamerika hat die Steuerforderung angesichts zunehmender gesellschaftlicher Differenzierung und wachsendem Finanzbedarf zur Entwicklung einer leistungsfähigen Finanzverwaltung und stabiler bürokratischer Organisationen beigetragen (Elias 1939; Tilly 1975; 1985; 1992). Die Abhängigkeit des Staates von der steuerlichen Abschöpfung ihm äußerlicher Ressourcen begründet dabei einen engen Nexus von Staat und Gesellschaft (*fiscal bargaining*), der der Etablierung liberal-repräsentativer Demokratien Vorschub geleistet hat (Bates/Lien 1985; Levi 1988). Entsprechend hat sich auch die jüngere Staatsbildungs- und Entwicklungsforschung diese Argumentation zu Eigen gemacht, um die Evolution staatlicher Strukturen und politischer Regime zu erklären (Bräutigam et al. 2008). Umgekehrt argumentiert die Rentierstaatstheorie (Mahdavy 1970; Beblawi/Luciani 1987), dass die Verfügbarkeit internationaler Renteneinnahmen aus dem Export natürlicher Ressourcen autoritäre Systeme in institutionell schwachen Staaten stärkt; staatliche Renteneinnahmen machten die Herausbildung einer leistungsfähigen Verwaltungsstruktur entbehrlich und der fehlende fiskalische Nexus von Staat und Steuerzahler verhindere die Aushandlung und Entwicklung demokratischer Institutionen (Ross 2001; Herb 2005). Umfangreiche Rohstoffrenten (insbesondere von *point-resources*) führten daher zu autoritären Systemen, während umgekehrt die Abhängigkeit von Steuereinnahmen demokratische Regierungssysteme befördere. Doch längst nicht in allen rohstoffreichen Ländern dominieren autoritäre Regierungen, während sich auch in rohstoffarmen Regionen über Jahrzehnte hinweg neopatrimoniale und autoritäre

Regierungsformen entwickelt haben. Das Panel analysiert daher die Erklärungskraft der beiden komplementären Forschungsstränge und fragt nach möglichen Erweiterungen, Einschränkungen, Synthesen sowie theoretisch-konzeptionellen Innovationen für die Forschung und deren politische Implikationen. Willkommen sind Beiträge, die den häufig allzu losen Zusammenhang von Regime und Revenue aus politikwissenschaftlicher, soziologischer und/oder historischer Perspektive durch die Herausarbeitung intervenierender oder ausgelassener (*omitted*) Variablen erhellen und dabei eine oder mehrere der folgenden Fragestellungen aufgreifen:

Erstens soll ausgelotet werden, welche Mechanismen in Steuerstaaten autoritäre bzw. demokratische Regierungsformen begünstigen. Jüngere Forschungen zum *fiscal bargaining* unterstreichen, dass für die Analyse des Nexus von Steuerstaat und politischem Regime lokalen, historischen und gesellschaftlichen Besonderheiten, aber auch Verteilungsfragen stärker Rechnung getragen werden muss (Ross 2004; Fjeldstad /Therkildsen 2008). Dabei können Fragen der Klassenstruktur oder ethnischen Zusammensetzung ebenso eine Rolle spielen, wie gesellschaftliche *cleavages* und politische Institutionen. Es sollen also zusätzliche, revenuebezogene Variablen identifiziert werden, die Demokratisierungserfolge aber auch die Resilienz autoritärer Regime erklären können.

Analog dazu sollen, *zweitens*, die Mechanismen und Kontextbedingungen eines ‚demokratischen Rentismus‘ bzw. der Ausweitung politischer Teilhabe in Rentier-Staaten diskutiert werden. In den vergangenen Jahren mehren sich Stimmen, die den Zusammenhang von Renten und politischem Autoritarismus relativieren oder gänzlich negieren bzw. auf erstaunliche Unterschiede bezüglich der politischen Partizipationsmöglichkeiten in verschiedenen Rentier-Staaten hinweisen (Dunning 2008; Haber/Menaldo 2011; Herb 2014). Demgemäß wird nach möglichen Erklärungen für die Herausbildung von demokratischer Teilhabe in Rentier-Staaten gefragt sowie deren Implikationen für die Rententheorie diskutiert.

Drittens sollen im Panel die Revenuequellen Steuern und Renten genauer in den Blick genommen werden. Dabei steht die Frage im Mittelpunkt, inwiefern unterschiedliche Eigenschaften von Steuerformen oder Rentenarten einen Beitrag zur Erklärung von Varianz auf der Regimeebene leisten können. So basiert ein Großteil der klassischen Arbeiten zum Rentier-Staat auf Rohstoffrenten insbesondere aus der Förderung von Öl. Hier stellt sich die Frage, ob die theoretischen Implikationen des Rentier-Staats auch bei Erweiterung des Rentenbegriffs um strategische Renten wie Entwicklungshilfegelder, Militärhilfen oder solche Renten, die aus der Hoheit über neuralgische Schifffahrtswege (Suez; Panama) abgeleitet werden, aufrechterhalten werden können (Moore 2004, 2008). Mit Blick auf Steuerstaaten stellt sich hierbei die Frage, ob Demokratisierungseffekte auf spezifische Steuerarten oder eine besondere gesellschaftliche Lastenverteilung zurückgeführt werden können (Campbell 1993; Lieberman 2003).

Schließlich stellt sich *viertens* die Frage, inwiefern sich die Annahmen bezüglich des Effekts staatlicher Revenuequellen auf politische Partizipationsforderungen der Bevölkerung bestätigen lassen. Hier sind insbesondere vergleichende Forschungen zu Mechanismen der Legitimierung politischer Herrschaft in Steuer- und Rentierstaaten von Interesse.

10. “Disentangling the State-Regime Nexus” (Double Panel)

Chairs:

Thomas Altmeyden, Institut of Political Science, University of Tübingen, thomas.altmeyden@uni-tuebingen.de

Mirjam Edel, Institut of Political Science, University of Tübingen, mirjam.edel@uni-tuebingen.de

Description

To a large extent, political science is about understanding political order and examining how differences in political order can be explained over time and space. Two concepts are usually at the heart of answers to this question: state and regime. Curiously, however, scholars rarely address the exact nature of their mutual relationship – despite its crucial importance for the study of a wide range of pressing issues, such as violent escalations of democratization processes or political developments in post-conflict societies. To narrow this research gap, we bring together scholars who share an interest in theory-development on how characteristics of both states and regimes are linked to each other and how they influence political order and political change. So far, the slowly emerging literature on the state-regime nexus suffers from three shortcomings: a democracy bias, a lack of engagement with existing concepts, and a lack of agency. We thus encourage scholars to include non-democratic regime types and to compare them to democratic contexts; to revisit existing concepts; and to (re)consider the role of collective actors (in state, regime, and society).

The first part of the panel is dedicated to *theoretical and conceptual* questions of the state-regime nexus: We look for strong papers reconceptualizing the relationship between state and regime, i.e. tackling questions of attributes, boundaries, and relations of the two concepts, as well as for papers proposing theoretically innovative arguments on sequencing, contingency, and conditions of state-regime patterns.

The second part of the panel seeks to bring together promising *empirical* research from various world regions contributing to the larger question of state-regime patterns. How do state and regime influence one another? Which external factor is of crucial importance in shaping a particular state-regime pattern? Building on sound empirical material, the papers also derive explicit conclusions on one of these two questions in order to contribute to theory-building and -testing.

The panel is open to scholars from different subfields (Comparative Politics, conflict studies, regional studies, political theory) and with different regional foci sharing the interest and expertise in analyzing and comparing state-regime relations across regime types, continents, and historical context.

11. Welfare – Production -Regime Triangle: Comparing Welfare State and Capitalism in Democracies and Autocracies

Chairs:

Daniel Buhr, University of Tübingen, daniel.buhr@uni-tuebingen.de

Markus Trämer, University of Tübingen.

Description:

Capitalism has become the dominant mode of production in our world. Despite the fact that there are very different stages and types of economic development towards global capitalism, all national economies are to some degree integrated in the world markets of goods, finances and services. Coming along with it, (new) social and political risks emerged and many societies invented regimes of social security. They installed welfare regimes in order to address the specific problems and disruptions like unemployment, pensions, care or illness. Thus, it is widely accepted that “advanced capitalism and the welfare state” (Offe 1972:479) are interrelated, if not interdependent, and originate in the same historical processes.

Depending not only on the kind of production regime, but also on the kind of political ideology and power base of the ruling elites, societies throughout the world implemented very different welfare state solutions. They are subject to a vast literature of mainly case study driven research and only partially – and mostly limited to the OECD-World – subject to systematic comparative research. And there is hardly any theoretical framework that combines *production*, *welfare* and *regime type* systematically. (One exception is the growing body of literature focusing on social policies).

One starting point for such a framework can be the integration of two main strands of literature that deal with aspects of this “Welfare State – Production Regime - State”-Nexus of political economies are the “Comparative Capitalism” or “Varieties of Capitalism”-Approach (VoC, Hall and Soskice) and the “Welfare State Capitalism”-Approach (WSC; Esping-Andersen). The first deals with the configuration and functioning of (mainly national) production regimes. The latter in turn analyzes societies’ reactions to the developments of advanced capitalist production regimes: welfare regimes and the “modes according to which welfare is distributed based on rights and duties of individuals vis-à-vis the state” (Schröder 2009: 21). Recent attempts to propose a joint framework for analysis (e.g. Schröder 2009; 2013; Estevez-Abe and Iversen 2001; Korpi 2006) can be used as a starting point for going deeper into conceptual and empirical discussions of bringing together both strands in a comparative perspective.

The panel will have *two main* foci:

- First, we welcome contributions focusing on issues of theory development in the production-welfare-regime type triangle.
- Second, we welcome papers focusing on empirical analyses, be they large, medium or small n comparisons, of a) production regimes, b) welfare regimes, c) institutional complementarities between both spheres, d) the interrelatedness of regime type, production and welfare.

12. Rule of Law vs. Rule by law – How do Autocracies and Democracies Govern?

Chairs:

Rolf Frankenger, University of Tübingen, rolf.frankenger@uni-tuebingen.de

Mirjam Edel, University of Tübingen, mirjam.edel@uni-tuebingen.de

Description:

Law, understood as the crystallization of social and political rules and norms, is one central category used in the analysis of political systems, even though the legal system is not part of the political system, but closely intertwined with it in various ways, as the legislature formulates legal prescriptions and the executive branch implements and sanctions the compliance to law, whereas the judicial branch is said to be the place for a) trials and on the constitutional level for control of norm compatibility of basic law and legislation. In other words, the legal system is structurally and functionally intertwined with the political system, even though these functions can be analytically kept apart: For example, Parsons identifies goal attainment (political system) and integration (legal system) as the core contributions for a society.

Even more, the structure and independence of the legal system and the kind of implementation of basic and other law often serve as variables for classifying political regimes in democratic and autocratic. Especially the notion of „rule of law“ is popular in such discussions. Or, understood as the full blown independence and compliance of all members of a society to the legal system, rule of law serves as a political ideal of democracy. On the other hand the concept of „rule by law“, understood as the selective use and independence of the legal system as a means of power, is often associated with autocratic rule. Examples of rule of law in Autocracies like Singapore or rule by law in Democracies like the Irish Google entertain at least some doubt about this clearcut difference. To explore the concept and function of law and the interrelatedness of legal and political system theoretically and empirically is one main task of this panel. Scholars can for example build upon frameworks of systems theory and functional differentiation (e.g. Luhmann or Parsons) as well as conceptual and empirical groundwork done e.g. by Fuller (1969), Finnis (1980), Tamanaha (2004), Möller/Skaaning (2014), Martin Shapiro (1989) or Ginsburg and Moustafa (2008) in order to address one or more of the following questions:

- What are the functions of law under different political regimes? They be used to classify political regimes?
- How can we conceptualize rule *of* and rule *by* law systematically? What are the causal mechanisms behind these concepts?
- What patterns of selective versus general applications of law (as means of power) can be identified in a comparative perspective?
- Can we think of rule of law as a specific pattern of institutionalization in democracies and autocracies?
- How are the integration / juridical subsystem and the political subsystems of societies interlinked? How are the exchange systems between both spheres structured?
- What are the policy objectives behind the use of law as means of power exertion in different institutional settings? (e.g. intra-elite-competition and hygiene; opposition and society repression; economic interests?)

Both empirical and theoretical papers addressing one or more of these or related questions are welcome.

Literature:

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13. Concept formation and Explorative Methods: What and how can methods contribute to Regime classification in comparative politics?

Chairs:

n.n. / Rolf Frankenberger, University of Tübingen rolf.frankenberger@uni-tuebingen.de

Description:

After even more than 60 years of comparative Politics and Comparing nations, identifying and categorizing different types of political regimes, as well as explaining their functions and functional differentiations are still vital and central tasks of comparative politics. And even the basic distinction between democracy and autocracy is still contested – depending on both theoretical and empirical strategies of classification (classic, radial, family resemblance) and definitions of thresholds.

On the other side, there is a growing body of methods in social science that can be used in an exploratory way. These are not only large n methods like cluster analysis, factorial analysis and regressions, but also medium n and macro-qualitative approaches like QCA. And even small n comparative designs might give first insights for classifications. Whereas at least some of these methods are used systematically in other disciplines like economics, psychology, and sociology in order to identify patterns, there still seems a lot to be done in comparative politics. Especially as new time series cross section datasets are built, that enable real large n analysis.

Papers contributing to this panel should aim to explore the potentials of explorative methods in either conceptual or empirical ways, or both. They could address one or more of the following aspects:

- What can different methods of empirical research like cluster analysis, factorial analysis, regressions contribute to regime classification
- What are strengths and pitfalls of Medium n and macro-qualitative Methods
- Do different logics of causal and conditional inference have impact on strategies of regime classification?
- What new ideas of how regimes can be classified could be developed when using explorative methods?
- What kind of data and indicators do we have and/or do we need for exploration?
- How can new methodological approaches contribute to test and improve existing typologies?
- Are there strategies that allow for integrating a broader set of variables to represent more complex social systems and their differences in kind vs. differences in degree?

14. Politische Bildung, Demokratie und Autokratie. Welchen Beitrag kann Soll das Fach zur Politischen Bildung leisten?

Chairs:

n.n. / Siegfried Frech, Landeszentrale für Politische Bildung Baden-Württemberg

Das Panel wird in deutscher Sprache abgehalten, Paper-Vorschläge senden Sie bitte an Rolf Frankenberger rolf.frankenberger@uni-tuebingen.de

Description:

Wissenschaftliche Erkenntnisse über politische Prozesse, Akteure, Institutionen und Strukturen bilden eine zentrale Grundlage der Politischen Bildung, deren Aufgabe und Zielsetzung es ist, breiteren Kreisen der Bevölkerung Kenntnisse über das politische Leben, seine normativen wie institutionellen Grundlagen, über Möglichkeiten und Grenzen des Politischen und politischen Handelns in der Bevölkerung zu vermitteln. Denn ein Gemeinwesen kann, so könnte man argumentieren, nur dann funktionieren, wenn seine Teile – die Bürgerinnen und Bürger, aber auch Organisationen und Institutionen – informiert sind über dessen Regeln und Normen; Und sich nicht zuletzt auch an diese halten. Dabei gilt zumindest in Deutschland der als Beutelsbacher Konsens der politischen Bildung bekannte Grundsatz, dass Kontroverses auch kontrovers diskutiert werden soll und muss.

Empirisch lässt sich erstens ein Erstarren linker und rechter Populismen und Extremismen in Europa und Deutschland beobachten. Diese stellen die demokratischen und pluralistischen politischen Systeme und Gesellschaften vor zahlreiche Herausforderungen. Wie kann mit diesen Entwicklungen umgegangen werden, welche Gefahren bergen sie für die Demokratie? Oder muss, nicht nur mehr Demokratie gewagt, sondern angesichts der zunehmenden Polarisierung geradezu ertragen werden? Zumindest so lange, wie sich politische Kräfte auf dem Boden der jeweiligen Verfassungen bewegen?

Zweitens ist in und jenseits von Europa neben der Persistenz von Autokratien auch eine Renaissance und ein Erstarren von Diktatoren und autoritären Herrschaftspraxen zu beobachten. Von Russland über die Türkei bis hin zu Ungarn gewinnen Autokraten neue Stärke und entwickeln in einigen Fällen eine Strahlkraft, die andere Staaten inspiriert. Nicht zuletzt gibt es Anzeichen für die gezielte Unterstützung von Autokratien durch andere Autokratien – Autocracy Promotion als Gegenstück zur Democracy Promotion. Auch hier gilt: Welche Erkenntnisse und Strategien können im Sinne einer politischen Bildung verwendet und diskutiert werden, die dem Beutelsbacher Konsens verpflichtet ist.

Im Rahmen des Panels soll diskutiert werden,

- 1) welche Arten von Erkenntnissen, Ergebnissen und Beiträgen die Disziplin der Vergleichenden Politikwissenschaft für die Politische Bildung zur Verfügung stellen kann;
- 2) Welche – auch normativen – Selbstverständnisse das Fach prägen;
- 3) Welche gesellschaftliche Verantwortung der vergleichenden Politikwissenschaft zukommt und wie sie diese wahrnimmt;
- 4) Inwieweit sie einen Beitrag zur Demokratieerziehung leisten kann oder muss.

In Kooperation mit der Landeszentrale für Politische Bildung Baden-Württemberg soll auf der Basis der Beiträge des Panels sowie weiterer ausgesuchter Beiträge ein Themenheft der Zeitschrift „Der Bürger im Staat“ (Auflage: 10.000) mit dem Titel „Demokratie und Autokratie“ erstellt werden. Dieses soll sowohl inhaltliche als konzeptionelle Beiträge zur Vermittlung von Kenntnissen der vergleichenden Politikwissenschaft über Politische Systeme enthalten.